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ABSTRACT
The paper offers a new approach for analysing capitalist development and
crisis, tying together mergers and acquisitions, stagation and globaliza-
tion as integral facets of accumulation. The framework builds on the
concept of differential accumulation, emphasizing the power drive by
dominant capital groups to beat the average and exceed the normal rate
of return. Four regimes of differential accumulation are articulated: internal
breadth by amalgamation, external breadth through green-eld investment,
internal depth via cost-cutting, and external depth through stagation. The
complex relationships between these different regimes, as well as their
broader societal implications, are analysed in light of the US experience
over the past century. Several broad conclusions emerge. (1) Of the four
regimes, the most important are amalgamation and stagation, which tend
to oscillate inversely to each other. (2) Over the longer haul, amalgama-
tion grows exponentially relative to green-eld investment, contributing
to the stagnation tendency of modern capitalism. (3) The wave-like pattern
of mergers and acquisitions reects the progressive break-up of socio-
economic ‘envelopes’, as dominant capital moves through successive
amalgamation at the industry, sectoral, national, and, nally, global level.
In this sense, the current global merger wave is an integral facet of differ-
ential accumulation. (4) Periodic lulls in amalgamation tend to be
compensated for by stagation, which appears as a crisis at the societal
level, but which contributes signicantly to differential accumulation at
the disaggregate level. An end to the present worldwide merger boom
could therefore trigger global stagation. (5) Stagation crises have been
previously ‘resolved’ when dominant capital broke its existing envelope,
pushing to amalgamate within a broader universe of takeover targets.
Given that there is nothing more to conquer beyond the global envelope,
future stagation crises may prove much more difcult to tame. 
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1 INTRODUCTION: THREE MYSTERIES
Corporate mergers, stagation and globalization are usually studied as
separate phenomena, belonging to the elds of nance, economics and
international political economy, respectively. This paper attempts to tie
them together as integral facets of capital accumulation.
Analysed independently, all three phenomena appear problematic,
even mysterious. Take mergers and acquisitions. These are now con-
stantly in the news, and for a good reason. Over the past decade, their
value reached unprecedented levels, surpassing for the rst time in
history that of newly created capacity. Yet, despite their importance,
mergers and acquisitions remain enigmatic. ‘Most mergers disappoint’,
writes The Economist, ‘so why do rms keep merging?’ (1998). According
to the textbooks, there is no clear answer. Corporate merger remains one
of the ‘ten mysteries of nance’, a riddle for which there are many partial
explanations but no overall theory (Brealey et al., 1992: ch. 36).
Stagation, although presently dormant, is equally embarrassing. 
Most mainstream economists believe that prices should increase when
there is excess demand and overheating, but stagation – a term coined
by Samuelson (1974) to denote the combination of stagnation and 
ination – shows they can also rise in the midst of unemployment 
and recession.1 A similar difculty arises with the opposite phenomenon
of inationless growth, such as the one experienced recently in the 
US. The standard explanation rests on the disinationary impact of 
accelerating productivity, although that scarcely solves the problem. The
fact is that even faster efciency gains have often failed to tame 
ination in the past, so why is it that they succeed now? Frustrated,
many economists seem to have nally thrown in the towel, suggesting
that we now live in a ‘new economy’, where the old rules simply no
longer apply.
And globalization, too, remains perplexing to some extent. Although
theories here vary a great deal, most seem to assume that in the nal
analysis globalization occurs because it is more efcient. Capitalist accu-
mulators, goes the argument, are propelled by the dual need to cut costs
and broaden markets; this is best achieved through integration; hence
the relentless pressure toward globalization. There is, however, a little
glitch in this logic. Somehow, intensifying trade and the integration of
production always seem to come together with various barriers, restric-
tions and limitations. International political economists tend to analyse
these as facets of statist protectionism, external reactions to market glob-
alization. Yet one could equally argue that such ‘protectionism’ is in fact
essential for accumulation, and that the logic of globalization therefore
has to do not with efciency per se, but with the control of efciency for
protable ends. 
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As it turns out, some of the mist surrounding these phenomena begins
to dissipate when we examine them not in isolation, but together, as
interrelated facets of accumulation. The following section, building on
the concept of differential accumulation, outlines an alternative frame-
work in which capital is understood as a strategic power institution. The
third section articulates the various regimes of differential accumulation
through which capital power is augmented, as well as sketching their
broader societal implications. It identies four distinct paths: green-
eld investment (external breadth), mergers and acquisitions (internal
breadth), cost-cutting (internal depth) and stagation (external depth).
The remainder of the paper develops and analyses the interconnections
between these regimes. The fourth section looks at the conicting effects
on differential accumulation of green-eld investment. The fth and sixth
sections, examining a century of mergers and acquisitions in the US,
combine the logic of corporate restructuring, capitalist integration and
globalization. The seventh and eighth sections explore the impact on
differential accumulation of cost-cutting and stagation, respectively. The
nal section ties up the analysis by presenting a tentative framework for
understanding the pendulum of global accumulation and crisis. 
2 DIFFERENTIAL ACCUMULATION
This paper is part of a larger joint research project, by Shimshon Bichler
and myself, into the nature and broader ramications of ‘capital as power’.
The analysis builds on the concept of differential accumulation, with
capital viewed as a strategic institution, a reection of capitalist power
over social reproduction.2 Radical writers have for long debated the rel-
ative signicance for accumulation of ‘production’ as opposed to ‘circu-
lation’ (for instance, Weeks, 1981; and Sherman, 1985). Classical Marxists,
preoccupied with the labour process, prioritized the former, whereas
Monopoly Capital theorists, stressing the structure of ownership, shifted
some of the emphasis to the latter. Less attention, however, has been 
paid to the categories themselves. The main problem is that the very separ-
ation between production and circulation, evident as it was in Marx’s
time, is no longer clear cut: services currently account for over 70 percent
of economic activity, complex production is increasingly carried out by
huge corporate coalitions whose non arm’s-length transactions blur the
meaning of market ‘circulation’, and alienation, expropriation and capi-
talist power have long transcended the boundary of the factory, spilling
over into consumption and into politics at large. Indeed, given that
capitalist labour and capitalist ownership are two sides of the same thing,
it is unclear why we need to prioritize one over the other to begin with. 
The concept of differential accumulation seeks to go beyond the
‘production-circulation’ debate. It sees capital as inherently political,
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which in turn enables us to integrate into the analysis, in addition to
production and consumption, also diverse phenomena such as oligo-
polization, ideology, religion, the state and military conict, as well as
mergers and acquisitions, stagation and globalization. Most impor-
tantly, such power processes are seen not as auxiliaries to an otherwise
‘pure’ notion of capital, but rather as essential to its understanding from
the very start.
Capital accumulation is of course one of the more problematic concepts
of political economy (for instance Robinson, 1953–4; Harcourt, 1972; Bliss,
1975; Obrinsky, 1983). Although the issue cannot be resolved here, the
thrust of the problem can be briey outlined. The main difculty
haunting both conservative and Marxist analyses is excessive emphasis
on ‘materialist’ considerations. For the neoclassicists, capital is a tangible
means of production, measured in its own technical units. For Marxists,
capital is not a physical thing but a dynamic socio-material transforma-
tion. Yet, when it comes to measurement, Marxists too resort to
materialistic units of ‘dead labour’. 
The problem, rst identied by Thorstein Veblen and later articulated
in the Cambridge Controversies, concerns the units of accumulation.
Neoclassical theory has never been able to explain what these units are.
Marxist theory measures capital in terms of ‘dead labour’, yet as Marx
himself openly acknowledged, once production grows in complexity it
becomes difcult if not impossible to identify labour contents, even on
paper; they simply do not exist (for more, see Nitzan, 1992; Nitzan, 1998;
and Nitzan and Bichler, 2000a).
An alternative way to tackle the issue is to build on Veblen, and treat
capital as a strategic institution, related to but distinct from production
as such. Seen from this perspective, the magnitude of capital, measured
in relative monetary terms as elaborated below, is a crystallization of capi-
talist power to shape and reshape the process of social reproduction. Much as
in Marx’s scheme, this power is exerted over human beings, mediated
through production for prot. But in contrast to Marx, who tried to
construct such power from the bottom up based on intrinsic labour
values, we look at it from the top down.
On the face of it, capital appears as nance, and only nance. In form,
it is simply the present value of expected capitalist earnings. The contents
of capital, however, are political in the widest sense of the term, and
the reason is not hard to see. Capitalist earnings are connected to pro-
duction, but the links are complicated and highly nonlinear. Owners 
are interested not in production per se, but in its effect on their rela-
tive prot. And since ‘too much’ production is by denition detrimental
to prot, it is clear that production alone – that is, without its surrounding
power institutions – is too limited a basis for understanding prot and
accumulation. 
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More importantly, there are numerous institutions and processes
which are linked to production remotely or not at all, yet bear heavily
on prot and accumulation. Corporate collusion, patents, taxation, trans-
fer pricing, racial discrimination, the moulding of consumer ‘wants’,
brainwashing, entertainment, armed conict, and so on and on – all have
an impact on prot. And once such effects are ‘discounted’ into asset
prices, they become facets of capital.
In other words, capital embodies, or crystallizes power which emanates
not only from the relations of production, but from the entire spectrum
of social power in capitalism. This broader perspective suggests that 
a bottom-up analysis of capital, based on what Marx called the produc-
tion base, is potentially too limited. A top-down approach, which incor-
porates from the very start all forms of power affecting prot, is possibly
more revealing.
Strictly speaking, capitalists exert their power over society as a whole,
so one whose prot amounts to one-hundredth of the total can be said
to control 1 percent of the entire capitalist process. But such power is
relevant only in relation to that of other capitalists, and only insofar as
it changes. In other words, the real challenge is not to exert power as
such, but to expand it against other contenders. And indeed,  in a devel-
oped capitalist context, modern investors seek not to ‘maximize prot’
but to ‘beat the average’. Their ultimate goal is not absolute accumula-
tion, but differential accumulation: having their prot rise faster than the
average, so as to make their distributive share bigger and bigger.3
The reason, again, is not hard to see. Like all other forms of power,
capitalist power is also based on exclusion. Unlike other forms of 
power, though, the dynamics of capitalism – particularly the ‘natural
right of investment’ – requires capitalists to exclude not only workers,
but also most other capitalists from accessing their sources of prot;
failure to do so implies not only the shrinking of their own share, 
but also glut and the possible disappearance of prot altogether. In this
sense, capitalist power is necessarily two-dimensional: imposing it on
society both assumes and implies a pecking order among capitalists
themselves. 
At the same breath, one can also argue that the very purpose of capi-
talist enterprise, much like in Mumford’s ‘mega machine’, is to articulate,
assemble and operate such power arrangements in the rst place
(Mumford, 1967; Mumford, 1970; and Nitzan, 1998). And if we are to
believe Veblen and Braudel, this power quest is not at all new; it lies at
the very essence of capitalism and has from the very beginning (Veblen,
1904; Veblen, 1923; Braudel, 1985). 
The result is that capitalist power institutions, however different qual-
itatively, are always the same in one crucial respect. They all aim at,
and are measured by, their relative outcome: the extent to which they
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generate differential accumulation. In this sense, capital is the highest
form of commodication, the commodication of power itself.
Note that, as it stands, differential accumulation is not a deterministic
law of motion. It does not have to happen. Our claim here is rather that,
over time, the quest for differential accumulation grows into an increas-
ingly central moment of capitalist development. That being said, there
is no telling whether or not differential accumulation will succeed, or
how exactly it will unfold. As a power process, it involves purposeful
action against opposition, so its outcome cannot possibly be automatic.
In contrast to neoclassical and some versions of Marxian economics,
where unobservable concepts such as utility, factor productivity, labour
value and maximum prot are used to build ‘closed’ deterministic
models, the analysis of differential accumulation relies on an observable
category – the rate of differential accumulation – in order to construct
‘open’, contingent explanations. And, indeed, on its own, differential
accumulation is a mere framework. Making it into a theory requires that
we prioritize its various trajectories, explaining how and why they
unfold, the circumstances under which they proceed or are held back,
and their broader societal implications. The present paper is an attempt
to explore some of these questions.
Furthermore, there is no assumption here that the same group of 
capitalists will dominate the process throughout. On the contrary, the
very essence of differential accumulation is an intra-capitalist struggle
simultaneously to restructure the pattern of social reproduction as well
as the grid of power (see for instance, Bichler, 1994–5; Nitzan and Bichler,
1996; and Nitzan and Bichler, 2001). The important point for us in this
paper, though, is the progressive differential growth of big business as
a whole, regardless of its particular composition. As George Orwell aptly
put it, ‘A ruling group is a ruling group so long as it can nominate 
its successors. . . . Who wields power is not important, provided that
the hierarchical structure remains always the same’ (Orwell, 1948: 211,
original emphasis).
The centrality of differential accumulation brings to the forefront the
process of corporate centralization. The rst to emphasize this process was
Marx (for instance, 1909, vol. I, ch. XXV), although he never integrated
it into his bottom up theory of value and accumulation, which relied
heavily on the assumption of competition and the free movement of
capital and labour. This limitation no longer applies in a top-down power
theory of capital. If accumulation is to be understood differentially, its
analysis should focus from the start not only on capital in the aggre-
gate, but also – and indeed more so – on the large corporate groups of
dominant capital at the core of the process.4 The origin of these groups,
the political-economic patterns of their evolution, the means by which
they expand, the broader implications of their differential growth, and
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the limits and contradictions imposed on that growth, are central to our
understanding of capitalist development in general and its current trajec-
tory in particular.5
3 BREADTH AND DEPTH
How could dominant capital achieve differential accumulation? For
the corporation, the level of prot is the product of the number of
employees times the average prot per employee. This decomposition,
although true by denition, is purposeful in that it helps us distinguish
between the ‘size’ of capitalist organization on the one hand, and its
‘elemental weight’, so to speak, on the other (a slightly different decom-
position, with prot seen as the product of sales times the prot share
of sales, is examined in Nitzan and Bichler (2001)). The rm can there-
fore raise its prot in two ways. The rst, which we call ‘breadth’, is to
augment its organization by having more employees. The second, which
we label ‘depth’, is to make its existing organization a more effective
appropriator so as to generate higher prot per employee. 
Applying the same logic at the differential level, the implication is
that a large rm will accumulate differentially by either: (1) expanding
its employment faster than the average; (2) raising its prot per employee
faster than the average; or (3) some combination of the two.6 Each avenue
– breadth or depth – can be further subdivided into ‘internal’ and
‘external’ sub-routes, leading to a four-way taxonomy: 
1 External Breadth: green-eld investment. A rm can achieve differential
accumulation by building new capacity and hiring new employees
faster than the average. This method is labelled ‘external’, since from
a societal perspective it involves a net addition of employees.7 Its
upper ceiling is the extent of proletarianization. The more immediate
limit comes through the negative impact it has on depth: ‘excessive’
green-eld growth creates a downward pressure on prices and hence
on prot per employee.
2 Internal Breadth: mergers and acquisitions. Strictly speaking, internal
breadth involves differential earnings growth through inter-rm
labour mobility. This can happen when a rm adds new capacity and
employment against cutbacks elsewhere, although such movements
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Regimes of differential accumulation
External Internal
Breadth
Depth
Green-eld Mergers & Acquisitions
Stagation Cost-cutting
relate more to industrial restructuring (labour mobility between sec-
tors) than to the size redistribution of rms (labour moving from small
to large rms). The situation is different with corporate amalgama-
tion via mergers and acquisitions, where no new capacity is created.
By taking over other companies, the rm increases its own prot rela-
tive to the average (which is virtually unaltered). We call this route
‘internal’ since it merely redistributes control over existing capacity
and employment. Merger and acquisition activity is perhaps the most
potent form of differential accumulation, serving to kill two birds 
with one stone: it directly increases differential breadth, while indir-
ectly helping to protect and possibly boost differential depth (relative
pricing power). It is limited, however, both by the availability of take-
over targets as well as by social, political, and technological barriers.
3 Internal Depth: cost-cutting. The purpose is to cheapen production faster
than the average, either through relative efciency gains, or by larger
reductions in input prices. It is ‘internal’ in that it redistributes in-
come shares within a given price. Although cost-cutting is relentlessly
pursued by large rms (directly as well as indirectly through out-
sourcing), the difculty of both monopolizing new technology and
controlling input prices suggests that the net effect is commonly to
meet the average rather than to beat it.
4 External Depth: stagation. Our emphasis on stagation rather than ina-
tion is deliberate: contrary to conventional wisdom, ination usually
occurs with, and often necessitates, some slack. Now, for a single seller,
higher prices commonly are more than offset by lost volume, but things
are different for a coalition of sellers. Dominant capital, to the extent
it acts in concert, can benet from higher prices since, up to a point,
the relative prot gains per unit outweigh the relative decline in vol-
ume.8 Of course, for this to become a continuous process (ination
rather than discrete price increases), other rms must join the spiral.
Yet, since small companies have little political leverage and are usu-
ally unable to collude, the result is to redistribute income in favour of
the bigger ones who can. We refer to this method as ‘external’, since
the redistribution occurs through a (pecuniary) expansion of the pie. 
What are the implications of this taxonomy? In addressing this ques-
tion, it is important to distinguish the case of an individual large
corporation from the broader analysis of dominant capital as a group.
A single rm may successfully combine different facets of breadth and
depth. Not so for dominant capital as a whole. If we look at breadth
and depth not as rm strategies, but as overall regimes, it quickly becomes
apparent that broader conditions which are conducive to one often under-
mine the other. For the sake of brevity, we group our arguments here
into eight related propositions: 
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l Proposition 1: understood as broad regimes, breadth and depth tend to move
counter-cyclically to one another. Breadth presupposes some measure of
economic growth as well as relative political-economic stability. Depth,
on the other hand, commonly implies restrictions, conict, and staga-
tion. Although strictly speaking the two regimes are not mutually
exclusive, they tend to ‘negate’ one other, with more breadth associ-
ated with less depth, and vice versa. 
l Proposition 2: of the two regimes, breadth is the path of least resistance.
There are two reasons for this. First, it is usually more straightfor-
ward and less conictual to expand one’s organization than it is to
engage in collusive increases in prices or in struggles over input prices.
Second, breadth is relatively more stable and hence easier to extend
and sustain, whereas depth, with its heightened social antagonism, is
more vulnerable to backlash and quicker to spin out of control. 
l Proposition 3: over the longer haul, mergers and acquisitions tend to rise
relative to green-eld investment. While both routes can contribute to
differential accumulation, as capitalism spreads geographically and
dominant capital grows in importance, so does the threat of excess
capacity. Mergers and acquisitions alleviate the problem whereas
green-eld aggravates it.9 The broader consequence of this shift is for
chronic stagnation to gradually substitute for cyclical instability.
l Proposition 4: the relative growth of mergers and acquisitions is likely to
oscillate around its uptrend. Corporate amalgamation involves major
social restructuring and is hence bound to run into roadblocks. The
result is a wave-like pattern, with long periods of acceleration followed
by shorter downturns.
l Proposition 5: the underlying logic of mergers and acquisitions implies
progressive ‘spatial’ unication, and, eventually, globalization. For amal-
gamation to run ahead of overall growth, dominant capital must
successively break its ‘envelopes’, spreading from the industry, to the
sector, to the national economy, and ultimately to the world as a
whole. In this sense, differential accumulation is a prime mover of
spatial integration and globalization.
l Proposition 6: cost-cutting is not a real alternative to an amalgamation lull.
The pressure to reduce cost is ever present, but its effect is more to meet
than beat the average. The principal reason is that productivity improve-
ments are neither inherently related to corporate size, nor easy to
protect. Similarly, reductions in input prices are seldom proprietary
and often spill over to other rms. 
l Proposition 7: a much more potent response to declining mergers and acqui-
sitions is inationary increases in prot margins. This is often facilitated
by previous corporate centralization, and although the process is
inherently unstable and short-lived, it can generate very large dif-
ferential gains. By its nature, though, such ination is possible only
REVIEW OF INTERNATIONAL POLITICAL ECONOMY
234
through a vigilant limitation of production, with the result being that 
ination appears as stagation. 
l Proposition 8: over the longer term, differential accumulation depends prim-
arily on mergers and acquisitions. In the shorter term, it can benet from
sharp stagationary crises. The main engine of differential accumulation
is corporate amalgamation, which thrives on overall growth and 
the successive break-up of ownership ‘envelopes’. Occasional discon-
tinuities in the process, however, push dominant capital toward an
alternative regime of stagationary redistribution. The result is a pen-
dulum-like oscillation between long periods of relative political-
economic stability accompanied by economic growth and low ination,
and shorter periods of heightened conict, stagnation, and ination.
A fuller theoretical and historical analysis of these general proposi-
tions is too wide to be undertaken here. It is nonetheless possible to
highlight their signicance by a brief examination of the US experience
over the past century. While this history is certainly unique to some
extent, the leading role of the US in general and of US rms in partic-
ular may offer insight into other cases, as well as into the broader nature
of capitalist development. Before starting our exploration, however, a
word of caution. Although the US offers the best historical data, these
are not always suited to our disaggregate analysis, occasionally forcing
us into rough approximations, roundabout estimates and bare specula-
tions. Our conclusions are therefore tentative, open to challenges, and
inviting further research and discussion. 
4 GREEN-FIELD
Employment growth is a double-edged sword for dominant capital,
directly augmenting external breadth (differential employment per 
rm), while indirectly threatening external depth (differential pricing
power). Consider rst the direct impact. In general, overall employment
growth augments the differential breadth of dominant capital, but the
reason is largely due to the way it affects smaller rms. Large compa-
nies react to overall growth mainly by increasing their employment ranks.
Smaller companies, on the other hand, respond by growing in number
(through the birth of new rms), as well as in size (by hiring more
workers). This is important since newborn rms, by their very nature,
tend to be smaller than the average. The implication is that, even if
green-eld growth is spread proportionately between dominant capital
and the rest of the business universe, as long as some of this growth
results in the birth of smaller rms, the net impact is to reduce average
employment per rm, thus augmenting the differential breadth of 
dominant capital.
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The evolution of this process in the US is illustrated in Figure 1 (series
are rebased for comparison). The data show that since 1926, the number
of corporations has risen 3.6 times faster than overall employment,
causing average employment per rm to drop by 72 percent (note the
logarithmic scale).10 The process has not been even, however. During
the two decades between the mid-1920s and mid-1940s, the number of 
rms remained relatively stable, rst because of the great depression,
and subsequently due to World War II. Changes in overall employment
were consequently reected more or less fully in the average size 
of rms, which fell during the early part of the depression only to 
rise rapidly thereafter. In the longer run, however, this proved an 
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Figure 1 US employment, number of rms and employment per rm
*Corporations only, based on the number of tax returns by active corporations.
**Non-agriculture private employment divided by the number of corporations.
Source: US Internal Revenue Service; US Department of Commerce through McGraw-Hill
(Online).
aberration. Capitalism is subject to strong centrifugal forces, one of which
is the inability of business enterprise to control the overall number of
actors on the scene. And indeed, after the war, the number of rms
started multiplying again while their average size trended more or less
continuously down. Since large rm employment has increased over the
same period, we can safely conclude that overall employment growth
boosted the differential breadth of dominant capital.
The indirect impact, operating through depth, is more complex and
harder to assess. On the one hand, the multiplicity of small rms keeps
their prot per employee low, partly by precluding cooperation and
pricing discretion, and partly by undermining collective political action.
This bears positively on the differential depth of dominant capital. On
the other hand, unruly growth in the number of small rms can quickly
degenerate into excess capacity, threatening to unravel cooperation
within dominant capital itself. The balance between these conicting
forces is difcult if not impossible to determine.
In sum, green-eld growth is no panacea for dominant capital.
Although the process boosts its differential breadth, it has an indeter-
minate, and possibly negative effect on differential depth. The main way
of counteracting this latter threat is through corporate amalgamation, to
which we turn now.
5 MERGERS AND ACQUISITIONS
Our discussion in this section begins with Figure 2. In this chart we plot
a ‘buy-to-build’ indicator which expresses the dollar value of mergers
and acquisitions as a percent of the dollar value of gross xed invest-
ment. In terms of our own categories, this index corresponds roughly
to the ratio between internal and external breadth. (The data sources
and method of computing this index are described in the Data Appendix.) 
The chart illustrates two important processes, one secular, the other
cyclical. First, it shows that, over the longer haul, mergers and acquisi-
tions indeed tend to become more important relative to green-eld
investment (Proposition 3). At the end of the nineteenth century, money
put into amalgamation amounted to less than 1 percent of green-eld
investment. A century later, the ratio is approaching 200 percent, and
rising. The trend growth rate indicated in the chart suggests that, year
in, year out, mergers and acquisitions grew roughly 3 percentage points
faster than new capacity. 
Now, whereas employment associated with new capacity is added by
small and large rms alike, amalgamation, almost by denition, increases
mostly the employment ranks of dominant capital. The net effect of this
trend, therefore, is a massive contribution to the differential accumula-
tion of large rms.11
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The reasons for this tendency are not at all obvious. Why do rms
decide to merge with, or take over other rms? Why has their urge to
merge grown stronger over time? And what does it mean for the broader
political economy? 
Needless to say, corporate amalgamation is a real headache for main-
stream economics, whose models commonly rely on the assumption of
atomistic competition. Marshall (1920) tried to solve the problem by
arguing that rms, however large, are like trees in the forest: eventually
they lose their vitality and die out in competition with younger, more
vigorous successors. On its own, though, the forest analogy was not
entirely persuasive, if only because incorporation made rms potentially
perpetual. For the sceptics, therefore, Marshall had to offer an additional
explanation. Even if large rms failed to die, he said, and instead grew
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Figure 2 US accumulation: internal vs. external breadth
*Based on splicing of separate series.
Source: See Data Appendix.
into a corporate caste, the attendant social costs were still tolerable –
rst because such caste tended to be benevolent and, second, since the
costs were outweighed by the greater efciency of large-scale business
enterprise. 
The rigorous spin on this latter argument was put by Coase (1937),
who stated that the size of rms was largely a matter of transaction
costs. Inter-rm transactions, he asserted, were the most efcient since
they were subject to market discipline. Such transactions, however, were
not free, and therefore made sense only if their efciency gains exceeded
the extra cost of carrying them through. Otherwise, they were better
internalized as intra-rm activity. Using such calculus, one could then
determine the proper ‘boundary’ of the rm, which according to Coase
was set at the point where ‘the costs of organizing an extra transaction
within the rm become equal to the costs of carrying out the same trans-
action by means of an exchange on the open market or the costs of
organizing in another rm’ (p. 96).
The ideological leverage of this theory proved immense. It implied
that if companies such as General Electric, Cisco or Lucent decided to
‘internalize’ their dealings with other rms by swallowing them up, then
that must be socially efcient, and that their resulting size – no matter
how big – was necessarily ‘optimal’ (for instance, Williamson, 1985; and
Williamson, 1986). In this way, the nonexistence of perfect competition
was no longer an embarrassment for neoclassical theory. To the contrary,
it was the market itself which determined the right ‘balance’ between the
benets of competition and corporate size, and what more, the whole
thing was achieved automatically, according to the eternal principals of
marginalism.
The argument is hard to refute, although that is by no means a blessing.
The problem is that marginal transaction costs – much like marginal
productivity and marginal utility – are unobservable, so reality can never
be shown as being at odds with the theory. For instance, one can use
transaction costs to claim that the historical emergence of ‘internalized’
command economies such as Nazi Germany or the Soviet Union means
they were more efcient than their market alternatives. The obvious
counter argument, which may well be true, is that these systems were
imposed ‘from above’, driven by a quest for power rather than efciency.
But then, can we not say the exact same thing about the development
of oligopolistic capitalism?12
In fact, if it were only for efciency, corporations should have become
smaller, not larger. According to Coase’s theory, technical progress, par-
ticularly in information and communication, reduces transaction costs,
making the market look increasingly appealing and large corporations
evermore cumbersome. And indeed, using this very logic Fukuyama
(1999) recently announced the ‘death of the hierarchy’, while advocates
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of the ‘E-Lance Economy’ (as in freelance) argue that today’s corporate
behemoths are anomalous, and will soon be replaced by small, ‘virtual’
rms (Malone and Laubacher, 1998). So far, though, these predictions
seem hopelessly misplaced: amalgamation has not only continued, but
accelerated, including in the so-called high-technology sector, where
transactions costs supposedly fell the most.
How can that be true? Why do rms give up the benet of market
transaction in pursuit of further, presumably more expensive internal-
ization? Are they not interested in lower cost? The riddle can be solved
by using Veblen’s distinction between ‘industry’ and ‘business’ (cf. 1904).
Improved technology can certainly reduce the minimum efcient scale
of production (MES), and indeed today’s largest establishments (plants,
head ofces, etc.) are often smaller than they were a hundred years ago.
Firms, on the other hand, are business units, and since they can own
many establishments, their boundary need not depend on production as
such. The real issue with corporate size is not efciency but differential
prot, and the key question therefore is whether amalgamation helps
rms beat the average, and if so, how?
The conventional wisdom here is that mergers and acquisitions are a
disciplinary form of ‘corporate control’. According to writers such as
Manne (1965), Jensen and Ruback (1983) and Jensen (1987), managers
are often subject to conicting loyalties which may compromise their
commitment to prot maximization. The threat of takeover puts them
back in line, forcing them not only to improve efciency, but also to
translate such efciency into higher prot and rising shareholders’ value. 
This argument became popular during the 1980s, when the earning
yield on US equities fell below the yield on long-term bonds for the rst
time since the 1940s, giving corporate ‘raiders’ the academic justication
(if they needed one) for launching the current merger wave. The logic
of the argument, however, was problematic. Mergers may indeed be
driven by prot, but that in itself has little to do with productivity gains.
To begin with, there is not much evidence that mergers are either
prompted by inefciency, or that they make the combined rms more
efcient (Ravenscraft and Scherer, 1987; Caves, 1989; Bhagat et al., 1990).
Indeed, as we argue below, the latent function of mergers in this regard
is not to boost efciency, but to tame it, by keeping a lid on overall capa-
city growth. Moreover, there is no clear indication that mergers make
the amalgamated rms more protable than they were separately,
although here the issue is somewhat more complicated. 
First, there is a serious methodological difculty. Most attempts to test
the effect of merger on protability are based on comparing the perfor-
mance of merged and non-merged companies (for instance, Ravenscraft,
1987; Ravenscraft and Scherer, 1989; and Scherer and Ross, 1990: ch. 5).
While this method may offer some insight in the case of individual rms,
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it is misleading when applied to dominant capital as a whole. Looking
at the amalgamation process in its entirety, the issue is not how it
compares with ‘doing nothing’ (that is, with not amalgamating), but
rather how it contrasts with the alternative strategy of green-eld invest-
ment. Unfortunately, such comparison is impossible to make, since the
very purpose of mergers and acquisitions is to avoid creating new
capacity. In other words, amalgamation removes the main evidence
against which we can assess its success. 
Perhaps a better, albeit unscientic way to tackle the issue, is to answer
the following hypothetical question: what would have happened to the
protability of dominant capital in the US, if instead of splitting its
investment one-third for green-eld and two-thirds for mergers and
acquisitions, it were to plough it all back into new capacity? As Veblen
(1923: 373) correctly predicted, such a ‘free run of production’ is not
going to happen, so we cannot know for sure. But then the very fact it
has not happened, together with the century-long tendency of moving
in the opposite direction, from green-eld to amalgamation, already
suggest what the answer may be. . . .13
The second important point concerns the meaning of ‘protability’ in
this context. Conventional measures such as earnings-to-price ratio,
return on equity, or prot margin on sales, relevant as they may be for
investors, are too narrow as indicators of capitalist power when such
power is vested in and exercised by corporations rather than individ-
uals. A more appropriate measure for this power is the distribution and
differential growth of corporate prot, and from this perspective mergers
and acquisitions make a very big difference. 
By fusing previously distinct earning streams, amalgamation contributes
to the organized power of dominant capital, regardless of whether or not it
augments the more conventional rates of return. In our view, this ‘earning
fusion’, common to all mergers, is also their ultimate reason. And indeed,
by gradually shifting its emphasis from building to buying, corporate
capitalism has so far been able not only to lessen the destabilizing impact
of green-eld cycles pointed out by Marx, but also to reproduce and
consolidate on an ever growing scale, instead of collapsing under its
own weight. The broader consequence of this shift has been creeping
stagnation (Proposition 3), yet as Veblen suggested earlier in the century,
the large accumulators have learned to ‘manage’ this stagnation for their
own ends.14
Now, this general rationale for merger does not in itself explain the
concrete historical trajectory of corporate amalgamation. Mergers and
acquisitions grow, but not smoothly, and indeed the second feature evi-
dent in Figure 2 is the cyclical pattern of the series (Proposition 4). Over
the past century, we can identify four amalgamation ‘waves’. The rst
wave, occurring during the transition from the nineteenth to the twen-
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tieth century, is commonly referred to as the ‘monopoly’ wave. The
second, lasting through much of the 1920s, is known as the ‘oligopoly’
wave. The third, building up during the late 1950s and 1960s, is nick-
named the ‘conglomerate’ wave. The fourth wave, beginning in the early
1980s, does not yet have a popular title, but based on its all-encom-
passing nature we can safely label it the ‘global’ wave.
This wave-like pattern remains something of a mystery. Why do
mergers and acquisitions have a pattern at all? Why are they not erratic,
or alternatively, why do they not proceed smoothly? So far, most attempts
to answer these questions have approached the issue from the micro
perspective of the rm, which is precisely why they usually run into a
dead end. 
One of the more famous explanations was offered by Tobin and
Brainard (1968; 1977). Their basic claim was simple: if green-eld capacity
is cheaper, a rm will build it from scratch; if existing capacity is cheaper,
the rm will buy it from others. Extending this logic to the economy as
a whole, we should therefore expect the buy-to-build ratio to be inversely
correlated with the ratio of market value to replacement cost, now known
as Tobin’s Q: the less expensive existing assets are relative to new ones,
the greater the proportion of ‘nancial’ to ‘real’ investment, and vice
versa. 
This seems sensible, except that in reality things happen to move in
the opposite way. Figure 3 depicts two series: our own buy-to-build indi-
cator, measuring mergers and acquisitions as a percent of gross xed
investment, and Tobin’s Q, based on the ratio of market value to net
worth at replacement cost of nonfarm nonnancial corporations (with
series smoothed for easier comparison). According to the chart, US capi-
talists seem to have gone out of their minds: instead of investing in what
is cheap, they systematically overspent on the expensive!
This looks anomalous, but only because we are using neoclassical
microeconomic logic to explain a complex power process. New capacity
may indeed be cheap if you are the only one adding it. But if your
competitors all do the same it is a different matter altogether. Under the
latter circumstances, the threat of glut and falling prot makes buying
existing assets much cheaper than it looks on paper. As we explain
below, large rms understand this all too well and act accordingly.15
In short, mergers and acquisitions, although pursued by individual
rms, occur within a broader and ever-changing political economic
context. It is only when making this restructuring process the centre of
our analysis that the general pattern of amalgamation begins to make
sense.
A highly interesting attempt in this direction was offered by Lebowitz
(1985), who tried to derive the tendency toward Monopoly Capitalism
from the very logic of classical Marxism. According to Marx, argues
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Lebowitz, the essence of accumulation is the expropriation of means of
production – initially from workers, but ultimately also from most capi-
talists – until capital becomes One, a unitary amalgamate held by a 
single capitalist or a single corporation. The road toward such amalga-
mation, he continues, proceeds through horizontal, vertical and conglom-
erate integration (although not necessarily following the stylised pattern
in Figure 2), and the key challenge is to show that all three phenomena
are inherent in the inner logic of accumulation. To establish this link,
Lebowitz begins by assuming, along with Marx, an intrinsic connection
leading from productivity growth to accumulation. Next, he suggests that
all three forms of integration increase efciency and hence contribute to
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Figure  3 Tobin’s Q?
Note: Series are smoothed as 5-year moving averages.
Source: Tobin’s Q pertains to ‘nonfarm’ ‘nonnancial’ corporations, and is computed from
the Federal Reserve Board’s Flow of Funds data through McGraw-Hill (Online) (Flow of
Funds codes: BS103164003L for market value, and BL102090005L for net worth at replace-
ment cost). For the buy-to-build indicator, see Data Appendix.
accumulation: horizontal integration creates economies of scale; vertical
integration leads to more roundabout, or mechanized production runs;
and conglomerate integration improves allocative efciency through
inter-sectoral capital mobility. To constrain any of these processes is there-
fore to hinder accumulation, and since according to Marx capital works
to dismantle its own barriers, it follows that all three types of integration
are inevitable, and that capitalism is destined to become monopolistic. 
Based on its own premises, the logic is undoubtedly elegant. The
premises themselves, however, are partly incorrect, as well as incom-
plete. The rst problem concerns production. As noted earlier and argued
further in section 7, beyond a certain point there is no necessary connec-
tion between industrial size and efciency/protability, so complete
productive integration cannot be traced to the inner logic of accumula-
tion.16 The second problem is the absence of power. Even if greater
industrial integration was always more efcient and protable, that
would still leave unexplained a growing proportion of mergers which
merely fuse ownership while leaving production lines separate. The dif-
culty is most clearly illustrated in the case of conglomerate integration:
inter-sectoral capital movement can improve allocative efciency only
through green-eld investment, but if so why does conglomerate consol-
idation almost invariably take the route of merger? The answer, by now
a bit tedious, is that business consolidation is not about efciency, but
the control of efciency for differential ends. While capital is forever
trying to remove the barriers on its own accumulation, this very accu-
mulation is inherently impossible without barriers being put on others,
including on most other capitalists. The act of merger fulls both of these
requirements, allowing investors to exercise their freedom to limit. 
Seen from a differential accumulation perspective, amalgamation is a
power process whose goal is to beat the average and redistribute control.
Its main appeal to capitalists is that it contributes directly to differential
breadth, yet without undermining and sometimes boosting the poten-
tial for differential depth.17 Thus, everything else remaining the same, it
makes more sense to buy than to build. But then everything else does
not, and indeed cannot remain the same. The reason is simple: amalga-
mation transforms the very conditions on which it is based.18
Three particular transformations need noting here. First, amalgama-
tion is akin to eating the goose that lays the golden eggs. By gobbling
up takeover targets within a given corporate universe, acquiring rms
are depleting the pool of future targets. Unless this pool is somehow
replenished, mergers and acquisitions eventually lead to a highly central-
ized structure in which dominant capital owns everything worth owning.
From a certain point onward, the pace of amalgamation therefore has
to decelerate. Although further amalgamation within dominant capital
itself may be possible (large rms buying each other), the impact on the
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group’s differential accumulation relative to the average is negligible: by
this stage, dominant capital has grown so big it is the average.
Green-eld growth, by adding new employment and rms, works to
replenish the takeover pool to some extent. But then, and this is the sec-
ond point worth noting, since green-eld growth tends to trail the pace
of amalgamation in both employment volume and dollar value, its effect
is mostly to slow down the depletion process, not stop it. Indeed, the
very process of amalgamation, by directing resources away from green-
eld investment, has the countervailing impact of reducing growth, and
hence hastening the depleting process. Thus, sooner or later, dominant
capital is bound to reach its ‘envelope’, namely the boundaries of its own
corporate universe with few or no takeover targets to speak of.19
Third, corporate amalgamation is often socially traumatic. It commonly
involves massive dislocation as well as signicant power realignments,
and is ultimately limited by the speed at which the underlying organi-
zations can adapt (this last point is emphasized by Penrose, 1959). The
consequence is that as amalgamation builds up momentum, it also gener-
ates higher and higher roadblocks, contradictions and counter forces.20
Taken together, the depletion of takeover targets, the negative effect
on growth associated with lower levels of green-eld investment, and
the emergence of counter forces, suggest that corporate amalgamation
cannot possibly run smoothly and continuously (Proposition 4). 
But then, why should amalgamation move in cycles? In other words,
why does the uptrend resume after it stumbles? And what does this
resumption mean? From the perspective of dominant capital, amalga-
mation is simply too important to give up. And while there may be not
much worth absorbing in their own corporate universe, outside of this
universe targets are still plentiful. Of course, to take advantage of this
broader pool, dominant capital has to break through its original ‘enve-
lope’, which is precisely what happened as the US moved from one
wave to the other (Proposition 5). 
The rst, ‘monopoly’ wave marked the emergence of modern big busi-
ness, with giant corporations forming within their own original industries.
Once this source of amalgamation was more or less exhausted, further
expansion meant that rms had to move outside their industry bound-
aries. And indeed, the next ‘oligopoly’ wave saw the formation of verti-
cally integrated combines whose control increasingly spanned entire
sectors, such as in petroleum, machinery and food products, among oth-
ers. The next phase opened the whole US corporate universe up for grabs,
with rms crossing their original boundaries of specialization to form large
conglomerates with business lines ranging from raw materials, through
manufacturing, to services and nance. Finally, once the national scene
has been more or less integrated, the main avenue for further expansion
is across international borders, hence the current global merger wave.21
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So far, the global wave has been characterized by considerable de-
conglomeration, with many rms refocusing on so-called core-activities
where they enjoy a leading prot position. The reason is that global-
ization enables additional intra-industry expansion across borders while
legitimizing further domestic centralization in the name of ‘global
competitiveness’. Eventually, though, such refocusing is bound to
become exhausted, pushing dominant capital toward renewed conglom-
eration, this time on a global scale. In fact, this is already happening in
areas such as computing, communication, transportation and entertain-
ment, where technological change is rapidly blurring the lines between
standard industrial classications.22
And, indeed, the pivotal impact of mergers is to alter not the struc-
ture of production per se, but the broader structure of power. The reason
is rooted in the dialectical nature of amalgamation. By constantly push-
ing toward, and eventually breaking through their successive social
‘envelopes’ – from the industry, to the sector, to the nation state, to the
world as a whole – mergers create a strong drive toward ‘jurisdictional
integration’, to use Olson’s terminology (1982). Yet this very integration
pits dominant capital against new rivals under new circumstances, and
so creates the need to constantly restructure power institutions, of which
corporate amalgamation is itself an important dimension. Surprisingly,
though, these power dynamics of mergers have drawn relatively little
attention in an area where they seem to matter most, namely in the
process of globalization. 
6 AMALGAMATION AND GLOBALIZATION
The gist of capitalist globalization is the spatial spread of accumulation,
whose main vehicle is the movement of capital.23 Most analyses of the
process concentrate on its alleged cyclicality. The common view is that
although capital ow has accelerated since the 1980s, the increase is part
of a broader recurring pattern whose peaks were in fact recorded during
the late nineteenth and early twentieth century (Taylor, 1996). The stan-
dard approach to these ups and downs in capital mobility is the so-called
‘Unholy Trinity’ of international political economy. According to this
framework, there is an inherent tradeoff between state sovereignty,
capital mobility and international monetary stability, of which only 
two can co-exist at any one time (Fleming, 1962; Mundell, 1963; Cohen,
1993).24 Thus, during the ‘liberal’ Gold Standard which lasted until World
War I, limited state sovereignty allowed for both free capital mobility
and international monetary stability; during the subsequent, inter-war
period, the emergence of state autonomy along with unfettered capital
ow served to upset this monetary stability; after World War II, the
quasi-statist system of Bretton Woods put a check on capital mobility,
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so as to allow domestic policy autonomy without compromising mone-
tary stability; nally, since the 1970s, the rise of neoliberalism has again
unleashed capital mobility, although it is still unclear which of the other
two nodes of the Trinity – state sovereignty or monetary stability – will
have to go.
Why has the world moved from liberalism, to instability, to statism
and back to (neo)liberalism? Is this some sort of inevitable cycle, or is
there an underlying historical process here which makes each ‘phase’
fundamentally different? The answers vary widely.25 Liberal interpreta-
tions emphasize the secular impact of technology which constantly
pushes toward freer trade and greater capital mobility, with unfortunate
setbacks created by government intervention and distortions. From this
perspective, postwar statism, or ‘embedded liberalism’ as it came to be
known, was largely a historical aberration. After the war, governments
took advantage of the temporary weakness of capitalism to impose all
sorts of restrictions and barriers. Eventually, the unstoppable advance
of information and communication forced them to succumb, with the
result being that the rate of return rather than political whim once again
governed the movement of capital. Critics of this ‘natural-course-of-
things’ theory tend to reverse its emphasis. Thus, according to Helleiner
(1994), the key issue is neither the expansionary tendencies of technology
and markets, nor their impact on the propensity of capital to move, but
rather the willingness of states to let such movements occur in the rst
place. From this viewpoint, state regulation is not an aberration but
rather the determining factor, which governments remain free to switch
on and off. One of the reasons for such cyclical change of heart, suggests
Frieden (1988), is the shifting political economy of foreign debt. Accor-
ding to this view, during the Gold Standard Britain became a ‘mature
creditor’, and was therefore interested in liberalization so that its debtors
could have enough export earnings to service their foreign liabilities.
The US reached a similar position during the 1970s, and used its hege-
monic power to re-impose liberalization for much the same reason.
According to Goodman and Pauly (1995), this second coming of liber-
alism was further facilitated by the desire of governments to retain the
benets of transnational production. The latter required that they also
opened the door to transnational nancial intermediation, hence the dual
rise of portfolio and foreign direct investment. 
Plus ça change, plus c’est pareil? Perhaps, but only because much of this
discussion focuses on the cyclicality of capital ow. As it turns out,
though, this preoccupation, convenient as it may be for those sceptical
of globalization, is not entirely warranted.26 First, although the pace of
globalization as indicated by the ebb and ow of capital movement has
indeed oscillated over time, its impact on the level of globalization tends
to be cumulative (Magdoff, 1969). Thus, while sceptics such as Doremus
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et al. (1998) are correct in pointing out that most companies are still more
national than global, the rapid pace of globalization suggests the situa-
tion may not stay that way for long.27 A second, related point is that
most analyses of capital ow concentrate on net movements – namely,
on the difference between inow and outow. This choice is inadequate
and potentially misleading. Capitalist integration and globalization can
move both ways, which means that the proper measure to use here is
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Figure 4 G7 private investment ows as a percent of gross xed capital 
formation
Note: Series are expressed as 3-year moving averages. Flow comprise direct and portfolio
investment. Gross ows are computed as the sum of inows and outows. Net ows are
computed separately for each country as the difference between inow and outow, and
then converted into absolute values and aggregated. Each series denotes the ratio of overall
G7 ows to overall G7 gross xed capital formation, both in $US. Data prior to 1977
pertain to Canada, Italy, UK and the US only.
Source: International Monetary Fund Balance of Payment Statistics and International Financial
Statistics through McGraw-Hill (Online).
the gross ow – that is, the sum of inow and outow (Wallich, 1984).
The net and gross magnitudes are the same when capital goes in only
one direction, either in or out of a country. But when the ow runs in
both directions, the numbers could be very different. This is clearly illus-
trated in Figure 4, which contrasts capital ow with gross xed capital
formation in the G7 countries. The chart shows that since the 1980s, 
the relative increase of gross private ows was both powerful and secular,
whereas that of net ows was more limited and cyclical. As a result, 
by 1998, the value of gross ows reached 58 percent of green-eld invest-
ment, compared to only 14 percent for net ows.28 Unfortunately, lack
of historical data on gross movements makes it difcult to compare
current developments with conditions prevailing at the turn of the
century. Nonetheless, the fact that the share of gross investment in 
GDP was generally higher than now, and that two-way capital ow 
is a relatively recent phenomenon, together serve to suggest that the
current pace globalization, let alone its level, may well be at an all 
time high.
The other common thread going through most analyses is that capital
ow is largely a response to the more ‘primordial’ forces of production
and trade. To us, this is akin to putting the world on its head. The global
movement of capital is ultimately a matter of ownership and hence power
(Nitzan and Bichler, 1996; Robinson and Harris, 2000). Note that, on its
own, the act of foreign investment – whether portfolio or direct – con-
sists of nothing more than the creation or alteration of ownership titles.29
Note further that the magnitude of such titles is equal to the present
value of their expected future earnings. Now, since these earnings can
fall as well as rise with output, and given the many ‘political’ factors 
at play, it seems clear that cross-boarder capital ows reect the restruc-
turing not of global production as such, but of the global politics of
production.
One of the rst to approach international capital mobility as a facet
of ownership and power was Hymer (1960), who argued that rms
would prefer foreign investment over export or licensing when such
ownership conferred differential power, or ‘ownership advantage’ as it
later came to be known. Based on this interpretation, the power of US-
based foreign investors seems to have risen exponentially over the past
half century, as illustrated in Figure 5. 
The chart presents two proxies for the globalization of US business.
The rst, measuring the share of export in GDP, provides a rough indi-
cation of the contribution to overall prot of trade. The second, measuring
the share of foreign operations in overall net corporate prot, approxi-
mates the signicance of foreign as opposed to domestic investment. Up
until the 1950s, the relative contribution to prot of foreign assets was
similar to that of export (assuming domestic and export sales are equally
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protable, so that the ratio of export to GDP corresponds to the ratio of
export prot to overall prot). But since then, the importance for prot
of foreign investment has grown roughly twice as fast as that of trade,
reaching 20 to 25 percent of the total in recent years. The faster growth
of foreign prot may seem perplexing since, even with the recent resur-
gence of capital mobility, US trade ows are still roughly three times
larger than capital ows. But then, unlike trade, investment tends to
accumulate, eventually causing overseas earnings to outpace those
coming from export.
This divergence serves to heighten the power underpinnings of trade
liberalization. Advocates of global integration, following in the footsteps
of Adam Smith and David Ricardo, tend to emphasize the central role
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Figure 5 The globalization of US business: ownership vs trade
Note: Series are shown as 5-year moving averages.
Source: US Department of Commerce through McGraw-Hill (Online).
of free trade. Unhindered exchange, they argue, is the major force under-
lying greater efciency and lower prices. And as it stands their claim
may well be true. Indeed, this is one reason why dominant capital is
often halfhearted about indiscriminate deregulation, particularly when
it allows competitors to undermine its differential margins. Yet despite
this threat, large rms continue to support freer trade, and for a very
good reason. For them, it is a means to something much more impor-
tant, namely free investment – or more precisely, the freedom to impose
and commodify power.
Although difcult to ascertain with available data, the cumulative
(albeit irregular) build-up of international investment has probably
contributed greatly to the differential accumulation of US dominant
capital. The reason is that whereas exports augment the prots of small
as well as large rms, the bulk of foreign earnings goes to the largest
corporations. It is therefore the globalization of ownership, not trade,
which is the real prize. While free trade could boost as well as under-
mine differential accumulation, free investment tends mostly to raise it.
But then, since free investment can come only at the footsteps of liber-
alized trade, the latter is worth pursuing, even at the cost of import
competition and rising trade decits. 
Foreign investment, like any other investment, is always a matter of
power. The nature of this power, though, has changed signicantly over
time. Until well into the second half of the nineteenth century, the rapid
spatial expansion of capitalism enabled protability to rise despite the
parallel increase in the number of competitors (Veblen, 1923: ch. 4;
Josephson, 1934; Hobsbawm, 1975: chs 2–3; Arrighi et al., 1999). As a
result, there was only limited need for collusion, and indeed most capital
ows were relatively small portfolio investments, associated mainly with
green-eld expansion (Folkerts-Landau et al., 1997: Annex VI). Even-
tually, though, excess capacity started to appear, giving rise to the
progressive shift from green-eld to amalgamation described in the pre-
vious section. Yet for more than half a century the shift was mostly
domestic, with mergers and acquisitions initially breaking through the
various national ‘envelopes’. It was only since the 1970s and 1980s that
the process started to become truly global, and when that happened 
the character of capital ow changed. The need to exert control has grad-
ually moved the emphasis toward larger, ‘direct’ foreign investment,
while the threat of excess capacity pushed such investment away from
green-eld, with over 75 percent of the world total now taking the form
of cross-boarder mergers and acquisitions (United Nations Conference
on Trade and Development, 2000: Figure IV.9, p. 117). From a power
perspective, therefore, one could say that whereas during the late nine-
teenth and early twentieth-century capital mobility was largely a ‘choice’,
by the end of the twentieth century it became more of a ‘necessity’,
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mandated by the combination of excess capacity and the cumulative
build-up of giant rms, for whom protable expansion increasingly
requires global amalgamation.
In summary, there is a long but crucial link leading from capital-
ism, to differential accumulation, to amalgamation, to capital mobility
(Proposition 5). From this perspective, the present process of global-
ization is inherent in capitalist development and therefore not easily
reversible without altering capitalism, or moving away from it altogether.
Moreover, contrary to popular perception, the underlying force here is
not greater efciency, but the control of efciency, and the purpose 
is not aggregate but differential gain. Over time, and particularly since
the 1980s, foreign investment has come to rely less on green-eld 
and more on cross-boarder mergers and acquisitions, as rms increas-
ingly break through their national ‘envelope.’ The big winners are 
the large ‘distributional coalitions’ of dominant capital. For society as a 
whole, the picture is less cheerful, as the emphasis progressively shifts
from green-eld to amalgamation, causing growth to recede and stag-
nation to creep in (Proposition 3). 
7 COST-CUTTING
Although mergers and acquisitions are the most effective engine of differ-
ential accumulation, they are not always feasible (Proposition 4). And
when merger activity recedes, dominant capital has to resort to other
means, or risk differential decumulation. In principal, this can be done
through either relative cost reduction (internal depth), or differential
stagation (external depth). In practice, though, the latter is much more
effective (Propositions 6 and 7).
Consider cost-cutting rst. The conictual dynamics of capitalism,
persistent even in the presence of oligopoly and monopoly, imply a
constant pressure on rms to improve productivity and reduce input
cost. This pressure, identied by the classical economists and reiterated
by all subsequent schools, radical as well as conservative, seems beyond
dispute. From the perspective of differential accumulation, however, cost-
cutting is much like ‘running on empty’. It helps dominant capital meet
the average rather than beat it. 
This claim is difcult to test directly, since data on productivity and
input prices are rarely, if ever, broken down by rm size. The indirect
evidence, though, seems to support our view here, if only provisionally
(gures in this section are computed on the basis of data from Fortune,
the US Internal Revenue Service, and the US Bureau of Labor Statistics).
The logic is straightforward: output per employee, taken as a broad
measure of ‘productivity’, is given by the ratio of sales per employee
divided by unit price (abstracting from inventory changes). Now, over
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the past half century, dollar sales per employee in large rms (the Fortune
500) have changed little relative to the comparable gure for the average
rm: the ratio between them was 1.4 in 1954, fell gradually to 1.1 by
1969, and then rose steadily, reaching 1.7 by 1993 (although the latter
increase is probably overstated due to the growing signicance of
outsourcing by large rms). We can also reasonably assume that prices
charged by larger rms have not fallen relative to those of smaller ones,
since as we show in the next section ination has historically worked
in their favour (direct evidence, though, is again unavailable). These
conjectures, along with our above denition, imply that productivity
gains by dominant capital have probably been roughly equal to the
economy’s average.
The difculty of achieving systematic differential cost-cutting is really
not that surprising. First, even the largest rms have only limited control
over their input prices, particularly with the proliferation of outsourcing,
and when they do exercise such control, the benets often spill over to
other rms (a wage freeze by dominant capital groups would empower
smaller rms to do the same; political pressure on OPEC by car compa-
nies to reduce oil prices would benet all energy users; an importer win-
ning a tariff reduction gives competing importers a free ride, etc.).30
Second, there is no inherent reason why large rms should be better than
small ones at developing new production technologies. For instance,
much of the current advances in bio-technology, information and com-
munication are driven by smaller companies, some with only a handful
of workers. Dominant capital is often unable to match this urry of inno-
vation, and in many cases nds it cheaper to let smaller companies incur
the R&D cost and then buy the more promising start-ups, sometimes just
to keep their technology from spreading too quickly.31 Finally, produc-
tion techniques, by virtue of their integrated societal nature, are notori-
ously difcult to monopolize. Unlike new products which could often be
protected through patents, copyrights and other threats, improvements
in the social organization of production tend to proliferate easily, under-
mining the initial advantage of whoever implemented them rst. 
8 STAGFLATION
Unlike cost cutting, stagation is a highly effective means of differen-
tial accumulation. At rst sight, this seems strange. How could large
rms benet from a crisis of rising prices, stagnating output and falling
employment? And if stagation is indeed so ‘accumulation friendly’,
why does it not continue indenitely? A fuller analysis of these ques-
tions is beyond our scope here, but the general thrust of the argument
can be briey outlined (for more on this, see Nitzan, 1992; and Nitzan
and Bichler, 2000b). 
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The impact on prot of raising prices and lowering volume is of course
nonlinear (think about the consequence for prot of moving along a
downward-sloping demand curve). But recall that our concern here is
not prices, but ination. Furthermore, we are interested in the impact of
ination not on prot, but on differential prot. These two qualications
make a big difference.
In contrast to mergers and acquisitions, which are commonly pursued
only by a subset of rms (the larger ones), a strategy of inationary
redistribution can succeed only within a broader inationary context in
which all prices tend to rise. That being said, it is also true that ina-
tion is never uniform and hence never ‘neutral’. Indeed, this is the whole
point: ination exists precisely because it redistributes. Paraphrasing
Milton Friedman, we can safely state that ‘Ination is always and every-
where a redistributional phenomenon’. The key question is who benets
from such redistribution, and this cannot be answered a priori. The
essence of ination is a comprehensive destabilization and restructuring
of all market relations, and although there is good reason to expect the
more powerful groups to come out on top, the identity of such groups
cannot be determined up front. It can only be decided in hindsight, based
on the distributional outcome.
In the case of the US, this outcome, illustrated in Figure 6, leaves little
doubt as to who the winners are. The data in the gure contrast two
series. The rst is the rate of ination, measured by the annual percentage
change of the wholesale price index. The second is the prot-per-
employee ratio, computed by dividing prot per employee in the Fortune
500 group of companies by prot per employee for the economy as a
whole. The latter index corresponds to our notion of differential depth,
its uctuations measuring the extent to which dominant capital – approx-
imated here by the Fortune 500 – is able to raise its prot per employee
faster than the average. 
As the gure shows, the success of dominant capital here has been
tightly and positively correlated with the overall rate of ination.32 In
other words, higher rates of ination have played into the hands of the
big players, allowing them to raise their prot per unit of organization
faster than their smaller counterparts. (Further analysis reported else-
where suggests that the link between ination and differential depth
was positively related to rm size: the larger the rm, the greater and
more systematic the differential gains from ination. See Nitzan, 1992.) 
But if the chart shows that dominant capital clearly beneted from
ination, it also suggests that this benet was always short lived, lasting
only as long as the underlying bout of ination. Indeed, the only way
to keep such gains coming is to keep ination going; and if the gains
are to be raised, ination needs to be accelerated. Although such increases
occasionally happen, and often with the desired impact on differential
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accumulation, they cannot last indenitely. As illustrated repeatedly
throughout history and across the world, ination is a risky business. It
is difcult to ‘manage’ and often degenerates into an uncontrollable
spiral whose consequences – for differential accumulation and more
broadly for the structure of capitalist power as a whole – are difcult
to predict.
For this reason, ination is more of a stop-gap option for dominant
capital. In contrast to breadth, whose differential impact is slower to
develop, the differential gains from ination, which has no upper 
‘technical’ limit, are potentially huge. These gains, however, come with
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Figure 6 Differential depth and ination
Note: The economy’s prot per employee is computed by dividing corporate prot with
inventory valuation adjustment and capital consumption allowance, less taxes, by the
number of non-agricultural employees. Fortune’s prot per employee is computed by
dividing net prot by the number of employees.
Source: Fortune; US Department of Commerce through McGraw-Hill (Online).
considerable risks, which under normal circumstances are deemed too
high. It is only when the gains from breadth dry up, that dominant
capital, seeing its differential accumulation undermined, moves reluc-
tantly toward relying on inationary redistribution.
The connection between ination and power here cannot be over-
stated. Mainstream theory, built on the belief in competitive markets,
insists that ination and growth should go hand in hand.33 This belief,
though, is usually based on a cyclical argument about supply constraints,
which, valid or not, is meaningful only in the short term. Over the longer
haul, capacity can be increased as needed so material bottlenecks are
largely irrelevant. 
The real key then becomes power. Since production provides no ‘nat-
ural’ bottlenecks, these have to be created institutionally, through collu-
sive and other arrangements among the key players. Regardless of their
particular form, the purpose of all such arrangements is to keep overall
capacity from growing too fast. The emphasis here on overall capacity is
crucial; dominant capital may be able to keep its own production stable
or even growing, but unless it manages to cap overall growth, coordin-
ation is bound to disintegrate into a price war, leading to disination or
even outright deation. 
The upshot is simple: over the longer haul, we should expect ina-
tion and growth to be inversely related. Long-term growth, far from
stoking the ination re, works to cool it off by undermining collusion.
Ination, on the other hand, requires slack and therefore tends to appear
as stagation. Before testing this proposition, however, it should be noted
that the term stagation has more than one interpretation. The ‘weak’
version, due to Samuelson (1974: 801), views stagation as ination
together with unemployment and under-capacity utilization. The
‘moderate’ version, found for instance in Baumol et al. (1986: 83), denes
it as ination combined with slow growth or recession. Finally, the
‘strong’ version, adopted for example by Parkin and Bade (1986: 618),
limits stagation only to instances in which ination occurs with falling
output. For our purpose here, the ‘weak’ version is not very interesting:
twentieth-century capitalism has been characterized by some measure
of unemployment and unused capacity throughout, so its ination was
invariably stagationary according to this denition. The ‘strong’ version
is also not very helpful, since falling overall output is relatively rare.
The more useful of the three is the ‘moderate’ version, particularly when
understood as a relationship. If growth is positively related to ination,
stagation is clearly an anomaly. If, on the other hand, the relationship
is negative, stagation must be seen as a ‘normal’ phenomena, intensi-
fying as growth declines and ination rises, and receding when growth
increases and ination falls.
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As it turns out, the long-term relationship between ination and
growth is almost invariably negative. Indeed, the evidence on this is
nothing short of overwhelming (although systematically ignored by most
economists). Figures 7 and 8 illustrate respectively the case of the US
over the past century or so, and of the industrialized countries since the
late 1960s. The data contrast ination and growth, both smoothed as 20-
year moving averages to accentuate their long-term pattern. The overall
relationship in both charts is clearly inverse, and these are by no means
exceptions. In fact, the same long-term pattern seems to repeat itself in
numerous individual countries, both developed and developing.
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Figure 7 US: long-term ination and growth
Note: Series are shown as 20-year moving averages. The thick curve running through the
observations is drawn free hand for illustration purposes.
Source: US Department of Commerce through McGraw-Hill (Online); US President
(Annual).
The negative long-term correlation between growth and ination also
helps explain the post-war schizophrenia of policy makers in capitalist
countries. Their stated, eternal purpose is to promote growth and assure
price stability. Their unstated commitment, though, has progressively
drifted in favour of differential accumulation. During breadth periods,
the stated and latent goals are consistent, with high growth and low
ination allowing policy makers to do little and claim success. The
problem arises when differential accumulation moves into depth, and
the macroeconomic scene turns stagationary. Then the two commit-
ments clash, and the winner is almost invariably dominant capital. Policy
is tightened, presumably in order to rein in ination, but the conse-
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Figure 8 Industrialized countries: long-term ination and growth
Note: Series are shown as 20-year moving averages.
Source: International Monetary Fund, International Financial Statistics through McGraw-Hill
(Online).
quence is often exactly the opposite: the economy slows, which is
precisely what dominant capital needs in order to keep ination going!
Occasionally, policy tightening claims a big victory – for instance,
during the early 1980s, when higher interest rates were eventually
followed by disination. But was tighter policy here indeed the cause of
lower ination? As illustrated in Figure 2, during the early 1980s domi-
nant capital began shifting back to breadth, with a new merger wave
gathering momentum. Under these circumstances, both the need for
ination and the ability to co-ordinate it tend to decline. If this inter-
pretation is correct, the real cause of disination was resumed breadth,
with restrictive policy in fact keeping ination higher than it would have
been otherwise.
Summing up, our analysis so far suggested that of the four paths to
differential accumulation, the more important are internal breadth
through mergers and acquisitions, and external depth via stagation
(Proposition 8). To wrap up the discussion, we now turn to examine the
relationship between the two, and what it may mean for the future.
9 ARE WE HEADING FOR GLOBAL STAGFLATION?
Figure 9 contrasts our amalgamation index (the buy-to-build indicator),
with a composite stagation proxy (both smoothed as ve-year moving
averages). The latter proxy is constructed rst by expressing unem-
ployment and ination as percentage deviations from their respective
historical means, and then averaging the two series into a combined
stagation index. (The purpose of including both ination and unem-
ployment is to accentuate the broader crisis aspects of depth, although
the pattern would have been similar had we used ination only.)34
The chart highlights several interesting features. First, it suggests that,
over the long haul, mergers and acquisitions were indeed the path of
least resistance (Proposition 2). Whereas stagation moved sideways,
oscillating around its own stable mean, mergers and acquisitions rose
exponentially relative to green-eld investment (note the logarithmic
scale). 
Second, it shows that since the turn of the century, following the initial
emergence of big business in the US, internal breadth and external depth
tended to move counter-cyclically, with temporary declines in the former
‘compensated’ for by sharp increases in the latter (Propositions 1 and
8). This pattern is indeed quite remarkable, particularly since, as we 
have emphasized, differential accumulation does not have to happen,
and can as easily go into reverse. Yet, as the chart reveals, major declines
in merger activity were almost invariably matched by intensifying
stagation, and when merger activity resumed stagation promptly
dropped. 
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Signicantly, this inverse correlation seems to have grown tighter over
time, perhaps as a consequence of the ascendancy of dominant capital
and differential accumulation.35 During the latter decade of the nine-
teenth century, when big business was just emerging, the two series still
moved in the same direction. This changed in the rst decades of the
twentieth century, and with dominant capital assuming centre stage, the
relationship became clearly negative although still somewhat loose. And,
then, from the 1930s onward, with differential accumulation becoming
entrenched, the negative t grew tighter and tighter.
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Figure 9 Amalgamtion and stagagation in the US
* Average of standardized unemployment and standardized GDP Deator ina-
tion (percent deviations from mean).
**Mergers and acquisitions as a percent of gross xed capital formation.
Note: Series are shown as 5-year moving averages (the rst four observations
cover available data only).
Source: US Department of Commerce through McGraw-Hill (Online) and sources listed in
the Data Appendix.
What are the implications of these patterns? First, they suggest that
globalization, far from contributing to growth, is likely to further 
exacerbate stagnation and unemployment. Considering the increasing
inclination of larger rms to buy capacity rather than build it, and given
that giant cross-border deals now make this tendency truly global, there
is little reason to expect brisk growth ahead. Based on this logic at least,
the downward growth trend evident for much of the post-war period
is likely to continue (Proposition 3).
Second and equally important is the tendency of lulls in merger activity
to trigger stagation crises. As noted, differential accumulation is not a
deterministic law of motion. If the process is to continue, however, the
logic elaborated in this article suggests that an end to the present merger
wave will likely be followed by yet another stagation crisis. This time,
though, the crisis could be different in both scope and duration. Contrary
to previous crises whose extent was at least partly contained by national
borders, this one may turn out to be truly global, in origin as well as
magnitude. Moreover, its resolution is likely to prove much more dif-
cult than before. Previous crises were defused when dominant capital
broke its ‘envelope’, moving to acquire rms outside its original universe.
This time, there are no more ‘envelopes’ to break. Dominant capital now
makes the world its playing eld. When this eld no longer yields enough
takeover targets, where can the large companies go? And if, after this
merger wave ends, there is indeed no new universe to conquer, what
will bring stagation to an end?
Of course, as these lines are written this scenario may seem far-fetched.
The global pool of takeover targets – including the privatization of state-
owned rms and public services – remains vast. Moreover, half of the
world’s population still lives pretty much outside the capitalist fold.
Their proletarianization promises plenty of new green-eld investment
to come, which will in turn continue to generate new takeover targets. 
Nonetheless, the analysis presented in the paper suggests that as domi-
nant capital gets closer to its ultimate, global ‘envelope’, capitalism will
become increasingly prone to stagation crises. The more immediate
barrier on further global amalgamation will likely be regulatory or nan-
cial. In many sectors global amalgamation is approaching ‘antitrust
thresholds’ as they are now called, and in some of them – including
information and telecommunication – it has already triggered regulatory
intervention (Hargreaves et al., 2000; and Pretzlik and Lewis, 2000). Also,
much of the current merger drive has been nanced by a rising stock
market, and if and when the boom turns to bust, this too could bring
amalgamation into a temporary halt. 
The ultimate barrier, however, is the contradiction inherent in a sys-
tem built on ever increasing power. Over the past several centuries, this
contradiction was obscured by the ‘horizontal’ dimensions of markets –
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equal exchange, free opportunity, democracy, and growing output. Yet
markets, important as they may be, are merely a mechanism in 
capitalism. The essence of capitalism is differential accumulation and the
relative expansion of power. This contrast between means and end is
crucial. Conceived of merely as a market system, capitalism could 
function indenitely, at least in principle. But as a social order built 
on augmenting power, it is necessarily self-limiting, and therefore nite.
From this perspective, the key issue is not the level of prot, 
but its distribution: whereas the former can always be increased, no 
capitalist can ever own more than the entire prot pie. And so, if large
companies continue to spend on amalgamation twice as much as they
do on new capacity, eventually – although we cannot say when – there
will be nothing more for them to conquer. The resulting corporate
oligarchy, reminiscent of Jack London’s description in The Iron Heel
(1907), may be able to increase its prot, but not its relative power.
Differential accumulation can disintegrate at any time. At this point,
however, it must come to an end, and with it so must capitalism as 
we know it. 
DATA APPENDIX
There are no systematic historical time series for mergers and acquisi-
tions in the US (other countries have even less). The series constructed
in this paper and plotted in Figures 2, 3 and 9, is computed on the basis
of various studies, which often use different denitions, covering
different universes of companies. 
The dollar value of mergers and acquisition for the period 1895–1919
are taken from Nelson (1959: Table 14, p. 37), whereas those covering
the period 1920–9 come from Eis (1969), as reported in Historical Statistics
of the United States (US Department of Commerce. Bureau of the Census,
1975: vol. 2, Table V38-40, p. 914). Both data sets cover manufacturing
and mining transactions only, and thus fail to reect the parallel amal-
gamation drive in other sectors (Markham, 1955). 
Data for the 1930–66 period are from the US Federal Trade Com-
mission, reported in Historical Statistics of the United States (1975: vol. 2,
Table V38-40, p. 914). These data, again covering only manufacturing
and mining, pertain to the number of transactions rather than their dollar
value. Signicantly, though, the number of mergers and acquisitions
correlates closely with the value ratio of mergers and acquisitions to
green-eld investment, during previous and subsequent periods for
which both are available (the 1920s and 1960s–80s). In our computations,
we assumed a similar correlation to have existed during 1930–66, and
hence used the former series (with proper re-basing) as a proxy for the
latter ratio.
REVIEW OF INTERNATIONAL POLITICAL ECONOMY
262
NITZAN: MERGERS, STAGFLATION AND GLOBALIZATION
263
From 1967 onward, we again use value data which this time cover all
sectors. Figures for 1967–79 are from W.T. Grimm, reported in Weston
(1987: Table 3.3, p. 44). For 1980–3, data are from Securities Data
Corporation, comprising transaction of over $1 million only. The last
batch, covering the period from 1984 to the present and coming from
the same source, consists of transactions of $5 million or more. The latter
two data sets are reported regularly in the US Department of Commerce’s
Statistical Abstract of the United States (Annual).
In constructing our indicator for the ratio of mergers and acquisitions
to gross xed investment, we divided, for each year, the dollar value 
of mergers and acquisitions by the corresponding dollar value of gross
xed capital formation (taken from the Historical Statistics of the United
States (1975) and from various issues of the Statistical Abstract of the 
United States). For the period 1930–66, we spliced in the number of deals,
linking it with prior and latter value ratios. 
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NOTES
1 During the late 1970s, a new branch of macroeconomic theory emphasizing
supply shocks claimed to have solved the mystery of stagation by blaming
it on extra-market forces such as wicked oil sheikhs and greedy labour unions
(for instance, Blinder, 1979; and Bruno and Sachs, 1985). By pushing up the
cost of raw materials and labour, these aliens cause decient supply (rather
than excess demand), which in turn has the double impact of raising prices
while lowering production. Such cost-push explanations are not entirely
misguided, only that they are rarely brought to their logical conclusion and
are therefore necessarily partial. The problem is that neoclassicists consider
prot to be a cost of production, on par with wages and rent. But if that 
is true, why can we have a wage shock and an oil shock, but not a ‘prot
shock’? Another solution, favoured by the expectations school (cf. Phelps,
1968; Lucas, 1972; and Friedman, 1976), was to return to Hume’s classical
dichotomy and argue that ination was a ‘nominal’ phenomenon, depen-
dent exclusively on expectations and liquidity, and hence consistent with
either stagnation or growth which were ‘real’ phenomena. The problems
with this latter theory are numerous, including the fact that its key explana-
tory variables – notably, expectations and the ‘natural rate of unemployment’
– cannot be observed directly, and often end up being ‘determined’ so to
speak by the econometric t (see Nitzan, 1992). 
2 The political essence of capital is emphasized in Bichler (1986) and developed
more fully in Bichler (1991). For the concept, implications and applications
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of differential accumulation, see Nitzan (1992); Nitzan and Bichler (1995);
Bichler and Nitzan (1996a); Bichler and Nitzan (1996b); Nitzan and Bichler
(1996); Nitzan (1998); Nitzan and Bichler (2000a); Nitzan and Bichler (2000b);
and Nitzan and Bichler (2001). 
3 Conventional theory celebrates the iron law of prot maximization, although
it is not very clear why. For one, the concept holds little water in the real
world. As Hall and Hitch (1939) showed more than half a century ago, few
if any capitalists know what maximum prot means or how to achieve it,
and as many studies before and since have suggested they instead use ‘mark-
up pricing’ to achieve a ‘target rate of return’ (for instance, Brown, 1924;
Kaplan et al., 1958; and Blair, 1972). The marginalists could not accept this
heresy. Led by Machlup (1946), they lashed back, arguing that regardless of
what businessmen said, in the end mark-up formulae were nothing more
than real-world techniques for maximizing prot – although they themselves
were still unable to show exactly what that ‘maximum’ was (Robinson, 1966:
78–9). Of course, many theorists cannot be bothered by such earthly debates,
only that the situation is hardly better in the higher world of textbooks. As
it turns out, maximum prot is indeed ‘workable’ in the extreme cases of
perfect competition and monopoly. But then what about the entire range of
‘imperfections’ between these (non-existing) ideal types? The problem, rst
identied by Cournot (1838), is one of oligopolistic interdependence, which
in its ‘unrestricted’ form makes maximum prot indeterminate, even in the
mind of the economist. Of course, game theory has solved this problem a
million times over, but only by assuming certain predetermined rules. Sadly,
though, real rms are free to ignore such rules, so the enigma of maximum
prot remains. 
4 The concept of dominant capital was rst coined and articulated in Bichler
(1986), Rowley et al. (1988), and Bichler (1991) as central for understanding
the development of modern capitalism in general, and of Israel’s political
economy in particular.
5 By focusing here on the corporation rather than its ultimate owners, we
bypass the long debate on the separation of ownership from control, rst
identied by Marx and latter intensied with the publication of Berle and
Means’ The Modern Corporation and Private Property (1932). The harsher
critiques of the ‘separation thesis,’ such as Zeitlin (1974), contested its conclu-
sions as being based on ‘pseudofacts’. Control, they argued, has never truly
been separated from ownership. Other, less hostile critiques, like Baran and
Sweezy (1966) and more recently Screpanti (1999), accepted that ownership
is increasingly separate from control, but maintain that this merely turns the
corporation into a more effective ‘prot machine’. One way or the other, we
concur with Veblen that the corporation itself, regardless of who runs it,
was historically necessary for the survival of capitalism. Without this insti-
tution, which for Marx signalled the immanent ‘abolition of capital as private
property within the framework of capitalist production itself’ (1909, vol. III:
516), the centrifugal forces of competition and excess capacity would have
probably killed the bourgeois order long ago. Any analysis of capitalism
must therefore have the corporation as a central building bloc. 
6 Strictly speaking, differential accumulation requires not a positive rate of
growth, but a positive difference between rates of growth. Dominant capital
can therefore accumulate differentially even with its own prot falling,
provided the average declines even faster. This understanding is assumed
throughout the article.
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7 For any given rm, green-eld investment can of course draw on inter-rm
labour mobility as well as on new employment. From an aggregate perspec-
tive, however, labour movement between rms is properly classied as
internal breadth.
8 Corporate capitalism, although always conictual, is rarely if ever compet-
itive in the sense of rms being ‘price-takers’. The view taken here is that
the very existence of prot presupposes power, which normally requires
some measure of both collusion and exclusion, tacit or otherwise (Nitzan,
1998). The success of such collusion/exclusion is reected, if only indirectly,
in differential prot margins, or what Kalecki (1943a) called the ‘degree of
monopoly’ (for alternative concepts of competition and their relation to prot,
see Ochoa and Glick, 1992).
9 The notion of excess capacity, associated mainly with Monopoly Capital
writers such as Kalecki (1971), Steindl (1952) and Baran and Sweezy (1966),
is admittedly problematic. Here, we use it to denote the potential threat to
prevailing prot margins from higher resource utilization. To illustrate, since
World War II, US margins, measured by the combined prot and interest
share of National Income, have been positively related to the rate of unem-
ployment (Nitzan and Bichler, 2000a, Figure 2, p. 80). In this context, a move
from higher to lower unemployment increases utilization and threatens
margins.
10 Our measurements here are not strictly consistent, in that we contrast the
number of corporations with overall non-agricultural private employment
(which also includes proprietorships and partnership), rather than with
corporate employment only (for which data are not publicly available). Based
on a comparison of revenue data, and assuming these are roughly propor-
tional to employment trends, corporate employment over the period has
grown by 17 percent more than overall non-agriculture private employment.
Correcting for this implies that average employment per corporation over
the period has fallen by 67 percent, compared with 72 percent indicated in
the chart. This bias is clearly too small to alter the overall picture. 
11 The effect on relative employment growth is probably somewhat smaller
than implied by the dollar gures. For one, amalgamated companies often
end up shedding some workers, and two, merger and acquisition data include
divestitures which reduce rather than raise employment. Correcting for these
qualications, though, would not likely alter the overall trend.
12 For more on the contrast between power and efciency arguments, see
Knoedler (1995).
13 A glimpse into what such a ‘free run’ might have looked like is offered by
the recent experience of Japan, a country where the merger medicine for
green-eld is still socially prohibited: ‘The underlying problem facing many
Japanese companies’, writes the Financial Times, ‘is that they have misallo-
cated capital over a long period. Instead of regarding it as a scarce resource
to be used as efciently as possible, they have pursued engineering excel-
lence. . . . Japanese production lines are often models of automated
efciency, but less attention has been paid to whether the goods on them
should be produced at all. Many companies have poured cash into projects
that will never generate a return above the cost of capital’ (Abrahams and
Harney 1999). 
14 Controlled stagnation is also used as a stick against labour, contributing to
the political supremacy of capital by preventing full employment. In the
immediate post-war years, this was achieved mainly through what Kalecki
(1943b) termed the ‘political business cycle’, with governments propping up
the economy, only to step on the brakes as soon as employment became ‘too
high’. In time, the mechanism was perfected into a fully-edged ‘political
trend’, as Steindl (1979) later called it, with tight neoliberal policies now
aimed at maintaining unemployment ‘naturally’ high. On the surface such
policies seem to sacrice accumulation for the more primordial goal of
keeping capitalists in the driver’s seat, although in practice the loss is often
more apparent than real. First, policy-induced stagnation shifts income from
prot to interest, but does not necessarily undermine the overall income
share of capital. Second, for dominant capital, redistribution from labour and
smaller rms could more than compensate for the negative impact on prot
of stunted growth. Finally, and no less important, the greater ‘stability’ asso-
ciated with stagnation translates into falling risk premia and a corresponding
rise in asset prices.
15 In this context, Tobin’s Q turns from a cause to a consequence, with mergers
and acquisitions driving up asset prices and therefore the ratio of market
value to replacement cost.
16 Economies of scale, impressive as they were in Marx’s time, are not a time-
less iron law, but rather historically and technologically contingent.
Diseconomies of scale can be as important, and there is no reason to believe
that completely centralized planning, capitalist or otherwise, is most ef-
cient. Similarly with roundabout processes – longer production runs may be
more efcient, but only up to a point, beyond which they almost always
run into organizational barriers.
17 Note that the act of merger itself has no direct effect on depth. Its impact
works only indirectly, through increasing corporate centralization, and even
that is merely a facilitating factor. Consolidation makes it easier for rms to
collude, but that does not imply that collusion will actually take place, or that
it will be effective in raising differential prot per employee. 
18 This is also why most macro studies of mergers and acquisitions, such as
Mitchell and Mulheirn (1996), Weston et al. (1998) or Winston (1998), are usu-
ally insufcient. Although they acknowledge the role of structural changes
such as increased competition, technical change and deregulation, they tend
to treat them more as external ‘shocks’ to which amalgamation is then a
‘response’. 
19 A typical illustration of this process is provided by the food business. During
the 1980s, the sector went through rapid amalgamation. In 1981, a $1.9bn
merger between Nabisco and Standard Brands created Nabisco Brands, which
then merged in a $4.9bn deal with R.J. Reynolds to create RJR Nabisco. A
few years later, KKR, which earlier acquired Beatrice for $6.2bn, paid $30.6bn
to take over RJR Nabisco in what was then the largest takeover on record.
Elsewhere in the sector, Nestlé took over Carnation ($2.9bn) and Rowntree
($4.5bn); Grand Metropolitan acquired Pilsbury ($5.7bn) and Guinness
($16bn); Phillip Morris bought General Foods ($5.7bn) and Kraft ($13.4bn);
BCI Holdings took over some Beatrice divisions ($6.1bn); and Rhône-Poulenc
bought Hoechst ($21.9bn). By the end of the 1980s, the merger urry died
down. According to a recent report in the Financial Times, food companies
are very cheap, yet ‘shareholders have deserted food stocks . . . partly because
of the absence of genuinely attractive acquisition targets’ in an industry
whose ‘biggest problem has been minimal sales growth’. During the 1990s,
there were a few more big transactions, such as the $14.9bn acquisition of
Nabisco by Philip Morris, but these were mostly reshufes of assets among
the large players. The experience of reaching the ‘envelope’ was aptly summa-
rized by a Bestfood executive whose company had been taken over by
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Unilever: ‘I have been to Benton-ville, Arkansas [home of Wal-Mart’s head-
quarters], and I would like to say that it is not the end of the world, but
you can see it’ (Edgecliffe-Johnson, 2000).
20 The effect of such counter forces can be dramatic. The 1933 Glass-Steagle
Act, for example, reversed an earlier diversication trend by US banks, 
preventing them from owning non-nancial corporations, a limitation which
is only now being relaxed. 
21 The process is of course hardly unique to the US. For example, ‘Before [South
Africa] started the progressive unwinding of exchange controls in 1994’,
writes the Financial Times, ‘large companies were prevented from expanding
overseas. With capital trapped at home, they gobbled up all available compa-
nies in their industries before acquiring companies in other sectors and
becoming conglomerates’ (Plender and Mallet, 2000). For analyses of differ-
ential accumulation, business consolidation and globalization in South Africa
and Israel, see Nitzan and Bichler (1996) and Nitzan and Bichler (2001). 
22 For instance, information, telecommunication and entertainment companies
such as Cisco, Lucent, Microsoft, AOL-Time Warner, NewsCorp, Hutchison
and Vivendi now increasingly integrate computing (hardware and software),
services (consulting), infrastructure (cables and satellite), contents (television,
movies, music and print publishing) and communication (internet and tele-
phony), while leisure rms like Carnival Cruise own shipping lines, resort
hotels, air lines and sport teams. Other companies, like General Electric or
Philip Morris, have never abandoned conglomeration in the rst place and
continue spreading in numerous directions.
23 Globalization of course has other dimensions, but these are secondary for
our purpose here. 
24 The rationale is based on the external account identity between the current
and capital balances. If the international monetary system were to remain
stable while states retain domestic sovereignty over exports and imports,
capital movements must be controlled in order to ‘accommodate’ the resul-
ting current account imbalances. In the absence of such capital controls, states
would have to give up their policy autonomy, for otherwise the mismatch
between the current and capital balances would upset international mone-
tary stability. 
25 For views and reviews, see Cerny (1993); Helleiner (1994); Sobel (1994); and
Cohen (1996).
26 For more on the globalization debate, see Gordon (1988), Du Boff et al. (1997);
Sivanandan and Wood (1997); Burbach and Robinson (1999); Hirst and
Thompson (1999); Radice (1999); and Sutcliffe and Glyn (1999). 
27 According to the World Investment Report, the share of transnational produc-
tion in world GDP has risen from 5.3 percent in 1982, to 6.6 in 1990, to 10.1
percent in 1999, while the average ‘transnationality ’ of the world’s top 100
transnational corporations increased to 54 percent in 1998, up from 51 percent
in 1990 (United Nations Conference on Trade and Development, 2000, Table
I.1, p. 4 and Table III.2, p. 76). (UNCTAD’s ‘Transnationality Index’ is dened
as the average of the ratios of foreign to total assets, foreign to total sales,
and foreign to total employment.) 
28 Note that the series in Figure 4 are based on quarterly data and therefore
fail to reect shorter ‘hot money’ movements. Their inclusion would have
further widened the disparity between the gross and net ows.
29 The popular perception that ‘direct’ investment creates new productive
capacity, in contrast to ‘portfolio’ investment which is merely a paper trans-
action, is simply wrong. In fact, both are paper transactions whose only
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difference is relative size: investments worth more than 10 percent of the
target company’s equity are commonly classied as direct, whereas those
worth less are considered portfolio. Conceptually, both direct and portfolio
investment occur on the liabilities side of the balance sheet, whereas the
creation of capacity affects the asset side. While total liabilities are by de-
nition equal to total assets, there is no one-to-one correspondence between
their underlying components. In this way the proceeds from a public offering
sold to portfolio investors can end up nancing a new factory, while direct
investment may be used to buy government T-bills.
30 The challenge to differential accumulation of ‘universal’ cost was summa-
rized neatly by Andrew Grove, Chairman of Intel: ‘How do you build a
company’, he asks ‘when your buyers are innitely knowledgeable and where
your suppliers maintain a level playing eld for your competitors? What
remains your competitive differentiator or your source of value or whatever
academic cliché you want to wrap around it?’ (Byrne, 2000).
31 ‘Big American companies’, writes The Economist (1999), ‘fear that innovation
is the secret of success – and that they cannot innovate’. Indeed, their 
‘terror’ is that ‘innovation seems to work best outside of them’, with the
result being that ‘Much of today’s merger boom is driven by a desperate
search for new ideas’, with trading in intangible assets reaching $100bn in
1998, up from $15bn in 1990. ‘Nobody holds out for organic growth any
more’, declares Sir Richard Sykes, chairman of Glaxo SmithKline which in
1999 controlled 7.3 percent of the world market for pharmaceuticals.
According to a recent Financial Times survey in which he is cited, the reason
has little to do with ‘efciency gains’. Indeed, ‘Those wary of mergers’,
reports the survey, ‘argue there is no evidence of scale contributing to greater
efciency. Ed Scolnick, chief scientist at Merck, found absolutely no corre-
lation between the size and productivity of his company’s research
laboratories. The relative success of small biotechnology companies suggests
that scale in research may even be a disadvantage’. Of course, this is hardly
a reason not to merge. As Jim Niedel of Glaxo points out in the same article,
‘doubling up’ [via merger] allows companies to screen twice as many
compounds, not to mention the resulting increase in ‘salespower’ (Pilling,
2000). In our terminology, it contributes to both internal breadth and external
depth. 
32 Fortune stopped reporting aggregate employment after 1993, but the corre-
lation in the chart probably stayed positive for the rest of the decade. Note
that the prot-per-employee ratio is the product of the sales-per-employee
ratio and the mark-up ratio (the latter being the ratio between the net prot
share of sales in the Fortune 500 and in the economy as a whole). Now, as
indicated in section 7, the sales-per-employee ratio remained fairly stationary
throughout the period. The mark-up ratio, on the other hand, was positively
and tightly correlated with ination throughout the period 1954–98. Given
the above relationship between these two series, the implication is that the
correlation between ination and the prot-per-employee ratio depicted in
the chart also continued to be positive after 1993. 
33 Supply-shock explanations of stagation are in this sense outside the main-
stream, since they acknowledge, if only half-heartedly, the existence of market
power. 
34 Ination uctuates much more than unemployment, and therefore domi-
nates the combined stagation index. The correlation coefcient between the
combined index and its ination component, both expressed as 5-year moving
averages, is 0.93.
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35 The 30-year moving correlation between the stagation and amalgamation
indices (with the latter expressed as deviations from trend), rose gradually
from a negative 0.11 in 1927, to a negative 0.9 in 1998.
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